Daily data on spot and forward dollar/sterling exchange rates and on Britain's foreign exchange reserves are used to reassess the financial history of the 1956 Suez crisis. We find that support of sterling at its Bretton Woods lower bound lost credibility as early as July. Reserve losses also are consistent with an exchange rate crisis. We provide the first econometric study of foreign exchange market intervention in the pre-convertibility phase of the Bretton Woods system. The Bank of England's interventions reacted strongly both to official sterling and to the transferable sterling market in New York, which suggests that convertibility was a central goal of policy.
INTRODUCTION
On November 5, 1956 , British and French paratroops landed at Port Said, at the head of the Suez Canal, to be followed by a naval armada. On the afternoon of the next day Harold Macmillan, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, told the Cabinet that $280 million of foreign exchange reserves had been lost in the previous week and that the sterling exchange rate could not be held without help from the United States. The
Eisenhower administration was strongly opposed to the invasion, so Macmillan persuaded his colleagues that there was no choice but to accept the UN demand for a cease-fire. conclusions. In particular Kunz (1989 argued that there was no documentary evidence for a serious run on the pound in the week of the invasion and that less than $100 million were lost in the first week of November. The most recent comprehensive history of the Suez crisis by amplified Kunz's conclusions by suggesting that Macmillan's belief that sterling was under pressure reflected a 'sensational loss of nerve.'
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These claims suggest to us that the economic aspects of the Suez affair are ripe for re-examination. Neither Kyle nor Kunz made any detailed reference to reserve movements.
Furthermore, the level of foreign exchange reserves is not the only indicator of pressure on a fixed exchange rate. The recent literature on target zones has yielded simple tests for credibility based on the position of forward rates in relation to an exchange-rate band. We analyze sterling credibility during the Suez crisis and supply a comprehensive description of the movements of British reserves. Our analysis uses daily data which allow a precise examination of the relation between economic pressures and political events.
Section 2 provides a brief historical background. We next document that there was a foreign exchange crisis. Section 3 analyzes sterling credibility during the crisis, and section 4 describes the behavior of reserves. We find that the weakness of sterling is underestimated by recent historical accounts.
Section 5 studies the reaction function of the Bank of England in defending the pound. The Bank's interventions can be modeled much like those of central banks during more recent dirty floats. We provide the first econometric study of intervention during the per-convertibility phase of the Bretton Woods system. The convertibility of sterling at a fixed rate had been an official commitment since the Anglo-American financial agreement of 1946, though some researchers have questioned the strength of this commitment, pointing to debates within the Treasury and the Bank of England on this question (see Fforde, 1992, p. 221) . Our results shed new light on this issue, for we find that the Bank reacted strongly to movements of both official and transferable sterling in New York, which suggests that convertibility was an important policy goal in 1956.
BACKGROUND
This section presents a thumbnail sketch of the events of the Suez crisis. Appendix A contains a more detailed chronology of events which may have influenced the foreign exchange market's perception of the strength of sterling.
On July 26 1956 Gamal abd-al-Nasir, Rais (President) of Egypt, whose relations with Israel had been sliding towards war, made a new set of enemies when he nationalized the Suez Canal, which was owned by an international firm under Anglo-French control. It is clear from all accounts that Britain and France were determined to reverse this action. Their governments were angry over the expropriation and regarded Egyptian control of the canal as a serious strategic threat to consumers of non-dollar oil supplies from the Middle East (see Kunz, 1991, p. 87) .
During the next three months, Egyptian pilots proved that they could successfully conduct ships through the canal. Britain and France tried to regain control of the canal through negotiations, supported by sanctions and by the efforts of the United States and other interested parties. However, the failures of the Canal Users Conferences disappointed hopes of a peaceful solution attained by international cooperation. Two major complicating factors were the tensions between Israel and Jordan, which some observers thought could bring Britain into action against Israel as well as against Egypt, and the turmoil in Eastern Europe, first in Poland and then even more seriously in Hungary.
Eventually the British government agreed to a French plan that their joint forces would occupy the canal zone. The Israelis, acting in collusion with them, would supply the pretext for this invasion by occupying the Sinai peninsula. This subterfuge was worked out in the notorious Sèvres agreement. Britain and France hoped to claim that they were merely separating the warring parties in order to safeguard an international waterway.
The second and most acute phase of the Suez Crisis thus began on October 29 when Israel invaded the Sinai peninsula.
If Britain and France hoped for support from the United States the timing of the invasion could not have been less opportune, given that it coincided with the Hungarian uprising and the US election. The US administration opposed the invasion from the start.
Once all parties had agreed to the cease-fire, the US used all the economic means at its disposal to force an unconditional withdrawal by the Anglo-French force. It was not able to immediately end the British and French action though, because the British Cabinet thought that the bridgehead its forces still held gave it a significant bargaining counter with Egypt. The US administration then used various economic means including blocking access to IMF credit and preventing Britain from using US government securities as collateral against new commercial borrowing.
Intense economic and diplomatic pressure first led to Macmillan's key statement to parliament on November 13 that the sterling parity could not be held indefinitely and then to Eden's withdrawal on November 23 on the grounds of ill health. When the US voted with the Eastern Bloc and the non-aligned nations in the Security Council on November 24 it became evident that the economic pressure would not cease. Britain and France gave way and withdrew from their bridgehead at the beginning of December 1956. In response to their withdrawal, the US immediately granted Britain an Export-Import (EXIM) Bank loan of $500 million and dropped its objections to Britain drawing the first two tranches of its IMF quota.
THE MORGENSTERN-SVENSSON TEST OF STERLING CREDIBILITY
We first examine the implications of the crisis for the credibility of the sterling-dollar exchange rate. The existence of upper and lower bounds for the nominal exchange rate under the Bretton Woods system allows us to use tools developed to study exchange-rate target zones. Define e t as the value of the pound in U.S. dollars, i t as the monthly nominal interest rate in dollars, and i * t as the sterling interest rate. Investors in New York could buy pounds at rate e t , invest them for one month at rate i * t then convert the proceeds back into dollars at rate e t+1 . The annualized, gross rate of return on this investment is:
If the Bretton Woods bounds, e = $2.78 and e = $2.82, were credible, then e t+1 would lie between them, which places bounds on the gross returns on spot contracts:
In 1951 the Bank of England had ceased to fix official forward rates and had allowed free forward dealing in all convertible currencies. 3 Thus an alternative strategy was to take a covered position, purchasing a one-month forward contract at the same time as the spot purchase. In that case the maturing investment in pounds could be converted to dollars at the known forward rate f 1 t . Suppose that covered interest parity held:
then it is easy to see that
If the Bretton Woods bounds were credible, then the forward rate should lie between them.
Examining this condition yields Svensson's (1991) simplest test of target zone credibility, also suggested by Morgenstern (1959, ch. 7) . This test does not require that uncovered interest parity holds. We examine condition (4) directly, rather than using interest-rate data, because we have daily data on exchange rates. Giovannini (1993) argued that measuring credibility using interest-rate differentials or forward rates may be inappropriate because of the pervasiveness of capital controls during the first phase of the Bretton Woods system. However, capital controls do not appear to have had a large effect on interest rates. We have examined departures from covered interest parity (a measure of capital controls) in weekly data. These departures never exceeded 2 percent, a value comparable to Obstfeld's (1993) Horne, 1988, p. 433 and Kunz, 1991, pp. 192-193 at the end of the year, it seems that the British attempts to win a waiver from the US on war debt payments had caused a serious lack of credibility. 12 It also seems that the negotiations of October were regarded by the market as only postponing a sterling crisis, because only the one-month rate moved to the inside of the band then.
Comparing the forward rates with the spot rate makes it clear that the theoretical stabilizing properties of exchange-rate bands were not operating in this case. Target-zone theory predicts that reversion to parity is expected as the exchange rate nears the edge of the band. 13 In that case the pound should go to a forward premium when the spot rate falls below its central parity. In fact, during the Suez crisis forward rates moved in the same direction as the spot rate and moved outside the band when the spot rate was near its lower limit.
The daily data allow us to look in more detail at the effects of Anglo-French and Israeli operations on the foreign exchange market. The two-and three-month rates moved relatively little from the end of October to the last week of November. This fact confirms that the threat to the pound predated the operation and that the recent historical literature has been right to assert that nothing decisive happened during the first week of November.
On the other hand the one-month rate shows a clear reaction to the Israel Defense Force entering Sinai on October 29, when the rate crossed the lower boundary of the band. The reaction comes before Britain and France vetoed the Security Council's censure of Israel on October 30 and shows that observers were linking Israeli actions to the canal crisis.
The second major decline in the forward rates begins on November 23, the day that Eden removed himself to Jamaica, ostensibly for health reasons. Figure 2 also shows a spike in the forward rates on December 11, which most likely constitutes a response to the IMF grant of a standby credit to Britain.
It seems unlikely that the movements of the forward rate reflected a response to the Hungarian uprising as well as to the Suez crisis. Giovannini (1993) , using monthly data, found that the three-month deutsche mark rate, which one would expect to respond to events in Hungary, remained well within the center of the Bretton Woods band during the two crises. This finding should be treated with some caution, though, because the convertibility of the mark in the dollar area was restricted in this period (see International Monetary Fund, 1957, p. 66 Overall the analysis therefore largely confirms the view of Kunz and others that there was no unusual occurrence in the first week of November. On the other hand we find that devaluation was considered likely by the market from the end of July onwards with a corresponding loss of credibility. Thus it is not correct to argue that there was no sterling crisis during Suez; it began well before the invasion.
RESERVES
We next examine daily data on Britain's foreign exchange reserves, as a further way to judge whether or not there was a sterling crisis in 1956. In addition, much of the controversy over Suez has revolved around the exact timing and magnitude of British reserve losses. Kunz, as discussed above, showed that Macmillan had overstated the size of sterling losses in the week before November 6. She also (1991, p.150) pointed out that the official figures seriously understate the size of the reserve losses. Table 1 provides an exact tabulation of the November balance sheet. The public was not informed that the official figure of $279 million reflected swaps and the sale of US Treasury bonds, and so did not know that $360 million was spent on market intervention. These swaps and Treasury bond sales were window dressing; these securities were not typically regarded as being part of the reserves. Account is not permitted, the dealers' reports provide an alternative source of information on high-frequency reserve movements. We judge this source to be reasonably accurate, because total reserve losses for November, as recorded in these reports, cumulate to $399.7 million, and total losses through intervention on the official market are $333.4 million, which are both very close to the figures in Table 1 . October shows little decline in the reserves, a development which parallels the behavior of the one-month forward rate in that month. Figure 4 presents market intervention. Positive entries represent increases in reserves, while negative entries represent losses of reserves. The massive intervention which began suddenly on 30 October is typical of a speculative attack on a currency. Taken together, the steady loss of reserves followed by an acceleration in reserve losses and intervention are typical of the other currency crises described by Bordo and Schwartz (1996) and Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996 On the basis of these data the loss in the first week of the crisis was somewhat higher than that mentioned by Kunz, being $116 million, but they confirm her conclusion that the magnitude was relatively small. Her statement that "no Treasury or Bank of England official mentioned the reserve loss as primarily New York in origin until November 20" (1991, p. 132 ) is less accurate. In fact these reports on foreign exchange markets state that the "New York market was extremely disturbed on the news of Israeli penetration into Egyptian territory". Other reports the Bank forwarded to the Treasury also stated that on
October 30 "in New York sterling was sharply offered". 17 It seems unlikely however that the Fed would have acted against sterling before Britain and France showed their hand by preventing the UN from censuring Israel, an event which took place on the night of October 30 (Kyle 1991, p. 364) . Since one of these reports is specifically dated midday it is unlikely that the Fed initiated the attack. Thus Macmillan was correct that sterling was under pressure in New York, but probably not correct that the Fed was the seller.
As table 1 shows, market intervention was the overwhelming cause of the reserve loss.
Thus it seems that commentators at the time placed too much emphasis on the minor attempts of Arab central banks to off-load sterling. 18 The efforts of the Bank of England to ascertain who sold sterling indicate a considerable role for currency speculation. The
Bank's officials found that as much as $120 million of the loss could be accounted for by purchases of emergency reserves by oil companies. Also important, though much less so, were purchases of sugar ($6 million), tobacco ($8 million), aircraft ($3.5 million) and ferrous metals ($5 million). 19 Excluding these purchases, which were responses to the expected disruption of trade and oil supplies, and also excluding transfers to other central banks,
there remain $215 million of reserve losses as a consequence of speculation or sales by panic-stricken holders of official and transferable sterling. Figure 4 also shows that the situation became worse throughout November. It was in the last two weeks of November that "US pressure was at its height" (Kunz, 1991, pp. 57-9; Kyle, 1992, pp. 500-503) . The official daily data suggest that the situation was worse than recent historians imagined. Kunz (1991, p. 156) , Kyle (1992, p. 500), and Fforde (1992, p. 555) all stated that British officials believed that sterling parity could not be maintained without a reserve of $2000 million. This figure was arrived at in official discussions from 1946 to 1948 and reflected judgements concerning the needs of post-war reconstruction, the repayment of sterling balances held by members of the sterling area, defence expenditure, and colonial development. 20 An alternative explanation, which reflects the fragility of sterling, is that this figure is slightly less than the value ($2240 million) of sterling balances held outside the sterling area, which could be readily converted to dollars (Fforde, p. 543 ). Kunz and Kyle observed that the authorities feared that reserves would drop below this threshold once the debt service on the post-war US and Canadian loans was paid in December. In fact figure 3 shows that this critical level had already been crossed by the end of the second week of November.
Comparison with previous sterling crises suggests that the authorities had reason for The data we have uncovered on reserve movements thus indicate that Britain experienced a serious exchange rate crisis between July 26 and December 7 1956. This conclusion follows whether we compare the time path of reserve losses to those in other exchange rate crises (as documented by Bordo and Schwartz (1996) and Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) ), compare the rate of reserve loss to those in other sterling crises (as described by Dow (1964) Figure 5 graphs the values of official and transferable sterling in New
REACTION FUNCTIONS
York. The dashed, horizontal line shows the central parity for official sterling, while the solid, horizontal line shows the lower edge of the exchange-rate band, e. As the figure shows, the discount on transferable sterling rose above 1 percent during the Suez crisis.
Transferable sterling provides valuable information in estimating a reaction function, for its fluctuations were not officially confined by the Bretton Woods bands.
Reaction functions, as surveyed by Edison (1993) , Dominguez and Frankel (1993) , and Almekinders (1995) , typically take this form:
Here I t measures intervention and I t−1 is included to allow for serial correlation. The term e * is a target level of the nominal exchange rate, while a reaction to e t − e t−1 represents leaning against the wind. Some studies also test for a reaction to time-varying exchangerate volatility. Dominguez and Frankel also emphasized the need for daily intervention data, which are available for the U.S., Japan, Germany, and Switzerland in the 1980s.
Studies which use such records include those by Gruijters (1991), Goodhart and Hesse (1993) , Dominguez and Frankel (1993) , and Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) .
In these studies the R 2 in equation (5) ranges from 0.20 to 0.40.
In daily data from 1956, the first reaction function we study is:
I t measures daily market intervention by the Bank of England, measured as the resulting change in reserves and graphed in Figure 4 . A negative value represents a sale of dollars.
The terms e t−1 and ez t−1 are the dollar exchange rates on official and transferable sterling in New York on the previous day. These are closing prices, so it was not appropriate to use current values (as in equation (5)) because the New York markets naturally close after those in London. The lagged dependent variable in equation (6) allows for autocorrelated news which influenced intervention. If we did not include this term, we might find a significant reaction to exchange rates simply because there was autocorrelation in both series.
The term e t−1 − 2.7825 gives the distance of the spot rate from the lower intervention point, illustrated in figure 1 . The term ez t−1 − 0.99e t−1 indicates that a reaction was triggered when the premium of official sterling over transferable sterling rose above 1 percent. For example, this premium rose when official sterling was on the Bretton Woods floor during most of November, and there was downward pressure on transferable sterling. Table 2 contains the results of estimating equation (6) is not stable when the sample is split at 29 October, the date of the Israeli invasion of the Sinai peninsula. Thus, although one could use equation (6) to estimate the impact effect of a depreciation (β 2 ) and the long-run effect of a depreciation (β 2 /(1 −β 1 )) we defer making these measurements while we examine the dynamic specification.
Although we adopted the partial adjustment mechanism in equation (6) for compara-bility with studies of more recent intervention, we next added lags with the hope of better capturing the dynamics. The equation estimated was:
In this case, intervention may respond to exchange rate values of the previous seven trading days. Equation (7) is equivalent to a linear regression of I t on six lags of itself and seven lags of the exchange rates e and ez. The error-correction specification is not necessary to ensure stationarity of the regressors in data from the Bretton Woods regime. When the exchange rate e t is confined to a band {e, e} it is stationary because all its moments exist.
Similarly, ez t is stationary provided that the transferable premium was bounded. However, writing this distributed lag model as in equation (7) has the advantage of isolating the longrun effects of the exchange rates on intervention, which are given by the parameters α 1 and α 2 . Table 3 contains the estimation and test results. Much of the residual autocorrelation is removed. By comparison with table 2, the Chow-test statistic reveals less evidence of instability after the invasion, although the statistic is significant at the 3 percent level.
When we examine the two parts of the sample, the general pattern is that t-values are lower in the sub-sample of November and December 1956. Although the specification might still be improved, we base inference on this equation.
In Table 3γ 11 estimates the impact effect of a depreciation in official sterling whileα 1 estimates the long-run effect. Both estimates are statistically and economically significant.
They imply that a 1 cent decline in sterling in New York would lead to the expenditure of 11.7 million dollars the next day by the Bank of England (with a standard error of 4.6 million dollars). The long-run effect is an expenditure of 4.5 million dollars (with a standard error of 1.5 million dollars). Thus the dynamic reaction function suggests that the short-run reaction to a depreciation was considerably greater than the long-run reaction, and was partly reversed in the week following an intervention.
Notably, a separate role is identified for transferable sterling. The impact effect is both small and insignificant. However, in the long run a 1 cent drop in the value of transferable sterling (towards 99 percent of the value of official sterling) forecasts an expenditure of 4.9 million dollars of reserves in its defense (with a standard error of 1.6 million dollars).
In this case the initial reaction is smaller than the cumulative effect. We also tested for roles for forward premia in New York and for the same-day rate in London. None of these variables was statistically significant.
The findings can be compared to studies of intervention in the 1980s in several respects.
First, there is a relatively small role for the lagged dependent variable, possibly because market participants did not directly observe I t−1 . In equation (6) the coefficient on I t−1 is 0.28 while the cumulative effect of the I t−i in equation (7) is 0.371. Actual reserve losses were reported monthly, with a lag, and were the subject of rumor within each month.
Second, the R 2 is comparable to those in studies of recent floats even though equations (6) and (7) are forecasting equations and involve no same-day explanatory variables.
During part of this period, and especially during November 1956, official sterling was at its lower intervention point. In this case, much of I t does not represent discretionary intervention, but rather a loss of reserves required to defend the fixed exchange rate. Here the contribution of this study is simply to document for the first time the daily reserve losses, and relate them to news of the Suez crisis. But additional findings concern both the nature of intervention when sterling's value was above 2.7825 and the response to transferable sterling.
During the crisis the the Bank of England spent about $30 million on the direct support of transferable sterling, which table 1 showed was a small share of total intervention.
However, table 3 shows that the Bank's support for official sterling also responded to the rate on transferable sterling. Our results suggest that transferable sterling can be thought of as a shadow exchange rate, when official sterling was at its floor. 25 The strong reaction of intervention to the discount on transferable sterling illuminates British financial aims during the crisis. This reaction reflected the importance attached by the Treasury and the Bank of England to maintaining fixed-rate convertibility, since the 1 percent spread between official and transferable sterling enabled 'back door convertibility'.
A question of interest to economists is why the authorities rejected alternatives to defending the parity, in particular adopting a temporary float. The answer was given by
Macmillan who told the Cabinet that this would lead to the break up of the sterling area and the end of sterling's role as a reserve currency. Direct warning of this danger was
given by the heads of seven sterling area central banks and conveyed by the Governor to the Chancellor (Kyle, 1991, p. 453) . The problem with such a strategy, which had maintained sterling credibility during 18th and 19th century wars, was that Britain had recently devalued. As George Bolton, the Executive Director responsible for the foreign exchanges, put it:
Devaluation of sterling in 1949, while to some extent justified by the consequences of the war, dealt the sterling system a blow from which it has not yet fully recovered. If, in present circumstances, we tamper with the present untidy pattern of rates or tend to regard reserves as more important than the present official rate of exchange, the sterling system may be finally prejudiced.
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Another traditional method of dealing with pressure on the exchange rate was of course an increase in Bank Rate. Sir Roger Makins rejected this course of action, preferring, in the Keynesian spirit of the time, to plan for a budget surplus in the next fiscal year.
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The contemporary economic orthodoxy held that Bank Rate changes were ineffective. The classic statement of official British Keynesian thinking on monetary policy, the Radcliffe Report, stated that "we have had little evidence of actual movements of funds in response to changes in shorter rates, or of any other measurable effects on the exchanges." Although this triggered a massive loss of reserves, the event did not significantly affect forward exchange rates. The historians have been wrong however to assert that there was no financial crisis. From the moment the Canal was nationalized the sterling exchange rate ceased to be credible and such credibility as had been regained was decisively reduced by the invasion. At the end of November these pressures came to a head, as reserve losses and falling exchange-rate credibility coincided and reserves fell below $2000 million. Moreover, the rate of reserve loss was greater than in other sterling crises.
In addition to providing new evidence on the credibility of sterling and the timing and scale of reserve losses, we have characterized the Bank of England's intervention tactics.
The Bank's goal was to do everything possible to defend the current parity. If that failed, a float with unification of the official and transferable rates (rather than more controls)
would have ensued, according to internal Bank and Treasury documents. 29 To the best of our knowledge, we have provided the first econometric study of intervention during the pre-convertibility period of the Bretton Woods system. Statistical evidence shows that the Bank used the Exchange Equalisation Account to react strongly to both the official and transferable sterling markets in New York.
In the Suez crisis, Britain was forced to abandon its political objectives in exchange for IMF credit. But the Bank of England and Treasury achieved a limited success in that they defended sterling without allowing a large discount on transferable sterling, until the negotiation of the IMF and EXIM Bank loans. A widening of the transferable discount would have been a significant retreat from convertibility. Our finding that the British authorities targeted this discount demonstrates that the they regarded convertibility as a priority in 1956, before the members of the European Payments Union formally adopted convertibility. The evidence also suggests that convertibility may have been regarded as more important than the foreign policy objectives of the Suez expedition. 
